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Abstract: Foreign investment management firms have recently started to play
a major role in the investment trust business in Japan. In terms of assets
under management, their size and market share have almost doubled in the
past two years. In part, the relative success of foreign managed firms in
attracting market share may be attributed to the fact that Japanese
investment trusts have underperformed benchmarks in quite a dramatic
fashion over the past two decades. This is at best indirect evidence that
Japanese funds underperform their foreign counterparts. In a recent paper
(Brown, Goetzmann, Hiraki, Otsuki and Shiraishi 2001) we show that the
underperformance can be attributed almost entirely to the unique tax
environment of Japanese investment trusts. In this paper we examine the
relative performance issue directly by looking at week by week returns for the
period January 23, 1998 through to January 14, 2000. Contrary to popular
perception, Japanese managers actually outperformed their foreign
counterparts over this period of time. Perhaps this indicates that Japanese
managers are more skillful. However, the evidence suggests that they
happened to be in the right place at the right time. We attribute the superior
performance to the asset allocation decision, rather than to any superior skill
in selecting securities.
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I. Introduction
The investment trust business in Japan has grown very substantially over the last few
years. In the period from January 1998 to January 2000 alone assets of open-type equity
funds grew by 61 per cent. As indicated in Figure 1, a large part of that increase can be
attributed to the increase in assets under management by foreign owned investment
trusts. Foreign investment management firms have recently started to play a major role
in the investment trust business in Japan. Over the period from 1998 to 2000 their
1From January 23, 1998 to January 14, 2000 the number of foreign managed
trusts grew from 184 to 364. The market share of foreign managed funds also
increased from 10.5% of assets under management in 1998 to 17.8% in 2000.
2Merrill’s investment trust business grew from ¥1.31Billion to ¥4.40Billion in
assets under management from 1998 to 2000 with the acquisition of Yamaichi’s
franchise.
3This underperformance was documented in Cai, Chan and Yamada (1997).
These authors were careful in the way they explained their findings. However
journalists were quick to attribute this poor relative performance to mismanagement
by Japanese investment trust managers with articles such as “Japanese investment
trusts: Punting in the dark” (Economist January 22, 1994). 
market share almost doubled1, with over 71 per cent of this growth coming from net
inflow of funds, particularly in 1998 (Figure 2). Much of this increase in market share
can no doubt be traced to aggressive marketing by foreign owned firms and the purchase
by foreigners of traditional Japanese asset managers2. However, at least part of this
increase can be attributed to the fact that  Japanese  investment trusts have
underperformed benchmarks in quite a dramatic fashion over the past two decades3. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the conduct and performance of Japanese funds
relative to their foreign counterparts. The fact that Japanese investment trusts have
underperformed benchmarks does not show that Japanese funds underperform their
foreign counterparts.  In a recent paper (Brown, Goetzmann, Hiraki, Otsuki and
Shiraishi 2001 ) (BGHOS) we show that the reported underperformance can be
attributed almost entirely to the unique tax environment of Japanese investment trusts.
Foreign investment trusts have taken a significant market share of the Japanese
investment trust industry in the last three years. For this reason,  it is possible to
analyze their relative performance in the same investment environment by analyzing 
week by week returns for the period January 23, 1998 through to January 14, 2000.
Contrary to popular perception, Japanese managers actually outperformed their foreign
counterparts over this period of time. Perhaps this indicates that Japanese managers are
more skillful. However, the evidence suggests that there are significant differences in the
behavior of Japanese managers. Foreign investment trusts are a little more adventurous
in their asset allocation decisions. The evidence suggests that Japanese managers
happened to be in the right place at the right time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and methodology used
in our analysis.    Section III reports the results.  The conclusion discusses the
implications of our findings and directions for future research.
II Data and Methodology
II.1 Data
The data used in our study derives from a database of daily fund valuations provided by
QUICK Corporation for 2234 open-type funds from January 23, 1998 through January
14, 2000. Total fund values are given as well as net asset value per share (NAV). From
this data are constructed 103 weekly holding period rates of return. Returns are
computed using NAV computed  at the end of each week as well as dividends paid during
that week, per unit of investment trust contract. QUICK Corp. also provided the
thirty-one narrowly classified Investment Trust Association (ITA) categories. As in
BGHOS (2001) we use this data to construct 9 broader classifications using the Monthly
Report for January 2000 issued by Kinyu Data Systems (KDS), which is basically the
same as the one used by the ITA. For the purpose of benchmark comparison we use a
money market rate based on the end of week percentage return quoted for 3 month
Japanese CD’s, a Japanese domestic fixed income return given as the percentage weekly
change in the Nikko Research Center Domestic Bond Index, a Japanese domestic equity
return given as the percentage weekly change in the value-weighted Equity Index of all
firms listed on the both 1st and 2nd section of Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya and finally a
foreign equity return given as the percentage change in the end of week MSCI World
Equity Index excluding Japan converted into Japanese yen.
II.2 Methodology
Following BGHOS (2001) two distinct methods of analysis were used to study the
performance attributes of investment trusts currently operating in Japan. In the first
place we use a returns-based classification algorithm developed in Brown and
Goetzmann (1997) [BG] to group the Japanese funds in our sample into a few
parsimonious categories.  This procedure is referred to as “Generalized Style
Classification” (GSC). The objective of this procedure is to use past returns to determine
a natural grouping of funds that has some predictive power in explaining the future
cross-sectional dispersion in fund returns. If there are K such styles the ex post total
return in period t for any fund j can be represented as:
4Observe that is equivalent to where
allowing for time varying expected return and beta that are conditional on
multivariate factor realizations It.
5To see this, note that the style benchmark given as the value-weighted average return 
within each style category,  , is an unbiased estimator of the true expected return
conditional on the factor realizations as of date t: .
where  is the expected return for style J conditional upon the factor realization  4.
If the idiosyncratic return component  has zero mean ex ante and is uncorrelated
across securities, the classification into styles will suffice to explain the cross-sectional
dispersion of fund returns to the extent that :Jt  differs across styles. The algorithm used
in BG assigns funds to styles in such a way as to maximize the explanatory power of this
equation, allowing for time-varying and fund-specific residual return variance. As
explained in BGHOS (2001) this procedure accounts for tax dilution effects to the extent
that the tax dilution effect is common across funds in a particular style and hence
impounded in . Note that this approach also justifies the common procedure of
forming style benchmarks for performance evaluation by value-weighting returns within
each style category5.
Once funds are allocated to styles, it is possible to determine the source of returns by
examining the relationship between style benchmark returns  and  proxies for factor
realizations . This regression corresponds to a procedure developed in Sharpe (1992),
and recently applied to mutual funds (Brown and Goetzmann, 1997) and hedge funds
(Fung and Hsieh, 1997). In this method, passive indices are used in a multi-factor linear
model as benchmarks.  The model constrains weights on these passive indices to be
positive and sum to one, while also allowing an unconstrained intercept.
We can then infer time-varying expected return and sensitivity of the benchmark to
factors using   and  .
Although we do not replicate the “conditional” performance measurement procedures
(c.f. Ferson and Schadt, 1996), we do allow for time-varying exposure  to factors both by
allowing the value weights wjt to change and by estimating the model using only 12
weeks of data. However, since implied sensitivity is assumed constant over three months,
this technology may not credit managers with timing skill. For this reason, the use of
style benchmarks is preferable to this regression based approach to performance
measurement.
6Most of the positive return can be attributed to the second half of 1999. In that period the
change in tax treatment of investment fund income that occurred in March 31, 2000 was widely
anticipated. Measuring returns from one year prior to the change in tax treatment to the end of
our data on January 14, 2000 the annualized  return reported by Japanese firms was 29.07% as
opposed to 9.32% for foreign firms.
III. Results
Contrary to popular perception, Japanese funds actually outperformed their foreign
competition over the period from 1998 through to the end of 1999. The relative
performance of Japanese and foreign funds is presented in Figure 3, with the Japanese
firms earning an annualized total return of 10.79 percent over the period, as opposed to
3.64 percent for foreign firms over the same period6.  
To examine in some greater depth the differences between Japanese and foreign owned
funds, we examined the time-varying sensitivity of Japanese funds and foreign funds to
four asset classes found to be useful benchmarks of Japanese fund investment
performance in BGHOS (2001). To do this we regressed fund returns on these four asset
class returns constraining the sum to equal one, allowing for a constant term. Japanese
and foreign implied asset weights were obtained as a weighted average of individual fund
coefficients, where the weights were based on the asset value of each fund. These weights
were computed on the basis of a rolling six week interval of the data, and the results
plotted as Figures 4 and 5. Inspection of these Figures reveals that there are distinct
differences between Japanese and foreign funds. The Japanese implied asset allocation
is reasonably stable over the entire time period. A little more than 60 percent of
Japanese funds are invested in Japanese domestic equity, with the remaining shares
equally divided between foreign equity, domestic bond and money market asset classes.
On the other hand, there is considerable time variation in the foreign-owned sector asset
allocations. Foreign-owned funds were invested about equally in fixed income and equity
securities, with about a 10 per cent allocation to Japanese equities in 1998. However, as
illustrated in Figure 5, both fixed income and foreign equity shares diminished
throughout 1999, while Japanese equity increased to about 40 percent of the total by
year end.
The fact that Japanese aggregate asset allocations appeared to remain relatively
constant  throughout the two year period does not necessarily imply consistency in style
of management. The broad aggregate asset class allocation may easily obscure changes
in allocation within each asset class. Furthermore, to the extent that BGHOS (2001)
identified at least one style of Japanese management to be related to the specific details
of the investment trust tax procedures, we would expect changes in style to occur in
anticipation of the tax law changes that were scheduled to come into effect on  March 31,
2000. We examined the asset management style using style benchmarks derived by the
GSC procedure described in the previous Section, and by traditional style benchmarks.
We find that the asset management styles of Japanese-owned funds were distinctly
different from the styles of foreign-owned funds, and that these styles changed over the
period of study.
We applied the Brown and Goetzmann algorithm to weekly return data for 2216  funds
with at least 6 weeks of data for the period January 23, 1998 through  January 14, 2000,
and were able to extract at most eight distinct management styles from this data. The
time varying sensitivity of the style benchmark returns to broad asset classes is
illustrated in Figure 6. As illustrated, these styles are quite distinct both in terms of
asset allocation and the way in which average allocations change through time. In
addition funds tend to group together that have a common fund management ownership
and stated fund objective.
An analysis of this data suggests the following style identifications:
GSC1 Domestic Equity
GSC2 Balance/International Limited Funds
--- characterized by North-American (78) funds and Daiwa-managed
(96 out of 97) Limited funds
GSC3    International
GSC4 Focused Equity Limited Funds
--- Dominated by equity funds managed by non-Big Three firms. All
28 Limited funds are foreign-owned
GSC5 Balanced Cash/Currency
GSC6    C.B. Funds
--- Most C.B. funds are included in this category; including many
Cash and (Non-equity) Derivative funds
GSC7 Index (Nikkei 225)                 
GSC8 Pure Cash 
                    --- More cash oriented than GSC6
In Figure 7 we illustrate the sensitivity of Japanese and foreign owned firms to these
style benchmarks. The fund returns are regressed on the eight style benchmarks with
coefficients constrained to be positive and add to one, allowing for a constant term
(alpha), using twelve weeks of data. Not only are the allocations more detailed than in
Figures 4 and 5, these style benchmarks account for any non-stationarity caused by
market timing, and as explained in BGHOS (2001) account for tax-dilution effects. We
now see a clear picture emerging. The high returns of the Japanese managed funds may
be attributed to the fact that many index-type funds (GSC 7) were changing style to
active equity management (GSC 1). What is not clear in this Figure is that both of the
Limited fund-involved styles (GSC2 and GSC4) are less significant closer to the end of
the sample period. We believe that this is a response to widely anticipated changes in the
tax law that came into effect on March 31, 2000. To the extent that this change was
widely anticipated, it would have reduced the importance of the tax-based Limited fund
investment style described by BGHOS (2001). However, there may be other explanations
for this change in investment style, including a growing importance of performance
competition among managers and expected large inflows of funds from post office
savings and from other sources.  
On the other hand, as illustrated in Figure 8, the relatively poor performance of the
foreign owned funds is partly to be explained by the fact that many of these funds were
switching from a broadly based International style (GSC3) in which they may have had
a comparative advantage into the same narrowly focussed domestic Japanese equity style
(GSC1) at the same time that Japanese managers were concentrating on this style. It
would be interesting to speculate whether this change was made in anticipation of the
new laws relating to income realized on investment fund transactions.
A similar picture emerges when we do the analysis again using the more traditional style
benchmarks (Figures 9 and 10). Index funds are moving into general equity in the case
of Japanese funds, and in the case of foreign-owned funds, international and balanced
funds are giving way also to domestic equity funds.
In Table 1 we report performance measures for Japanese and foreign investment funds
given the two style benchmarks we have used. As noted before, these style benchmarks
account for any residual tax dilution effect, and also allow for the possibility that
managers adopt dynamic trading strategies that cause expected return and factor
exposures to vary through the estimation period. The estimation procedure also allows
for the possibility of style shift within each non-overlapping 12 week estimation period.
The results show that the high returns for Japanese investment trusts were associated
with significant positive performance in excess of style benchmarks over the 1998-99
period, and that consistent with the performance numbers reported in Figure 3, the
abnormal positive performance was concentrated in the last half of 1999, perhaps in
anticipation of the tax law changes of 2000. However, we cannot conclude from this
evidence that the Japanese managers were relatively more skillful than their foreign
counterparts. Foreign managers also experienced positive performance over the same
period (of a similar order of  magnitude although not statistically significant). Since the
evidence shows clearly that both Japanese and foreign managers changed style
significantly over the latter half of 1999 and are becoming more similar, the positive
performance of both Japanese and foreigners alike is probably more to be attributed to
their being in the right place at the right time than to any particular or special skill
acquired in the last half of 1999.
IV. Conclusion
Japanese investment trusts have underperformed benchmarks in quite a dramatic
fashion over the past two decades. This widely publicised fact has shaken public
confidence in the industry, the third largest investment trust business in the world
outside of the United States and France. It has also opened the door to foreign
competition, and foreign-owned funds increased in size over 70 per cent from new
investments in 1998 alone. The perception is obviously that foreign owned funds are
more successful than their home-grown competition. If true, this result would be most
interesting indeed. In the past, foreign-owned funds specialized in international
investments for which they had some comparative advantage. But recently they have
been investing more heavily in the Japanese domestic equity market, and are employing
large numbers of Japanese managers to construct and monitor these portfolios. 
The fact that Japanese investment trusts underperform benchmarks is at best indirect
evidence that Japanese funds also underperform their foreign counterparts. In a recent
paper BGHOS (2001) show that the underperformance can be attributed almost entirely
to the unique tax environment of Japanese investment trusts. In this paper we examine
the relative performance issue directly by looking at week by week returns for the period
January 23, 1998 through to January 14, 2000. Contrary to popular perception, Japanese
managers actually outperformed their foreign counterparts over this period of time.
Perhaps this indicates that Japanese managers are more skillful. However, the evidence
suggests that they happened to be in the right place at the right time. We attribute the
superior performance to the asset allocation decision, rather than to any superior skill
in selecting securities.
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Table 1:
Performance measures for Japanese and foreign owned funds estimated on the basis
of eight non-overlapping 12 week periods 1998-99
Eight GSC Style Benchmarks Nine traditional style benchmarks
12 weeks
ending
Japanese
funds
Foreign
funds Difference
Japanese
funds
Foreign
funds Difference
05-Jun-98 -0.0328% 0.0013% -0.0341% -0.0184% 0.1687% -0.1871%
28-Aug-98 -0.0388% -0.1202% 0.0814% -0.0262% -0.0594% 0.0333%
20-Nov-98 0.0707% 0.0902% -0.0195% 0.0388% -0.1413% 0.1801%
12-Feb-99 0.0054% -0.0007% 0.0060% 0.0331% 0.0319% 0.0011%
07-May-99 0.1584% 0.0727% 0.0857% 0.1786% -0.0195% 0.1981%
30-Jul-99 0.0834% 0.0919% -0.0085% 0.0511% 0.0140% 0.0372%
22-Oct-99 0.0773% 0.1196% -0.0423% 0.0611% 0.0357% 0.0254%
14-Jan-00 0.0814% 0.1699% -0.0885% 0.1817% 0.2008% -0.0191%
Average 0.0506% 0.0531% -0.0025% 0.0625% 0.0289% 0.0336%
t-value (2.13) (1.66) (-0.12) (2.24) (0.73) (0.79)
Numbers in this table give the weighted average of alpha measures for all funds in
each ownership category, where the weights are proportional to the total assets under
management in each fund. The individual fund alphas are estimated from the 
regression equation where the coefficients are constrained to 
be positive and to sum to one, and the factors are the style benchmarks given in
the first panel by the 8 GSC style benchmarks and in the second panel by the 9
traditional style categories.  Note that if the fund’s style is constant over the 12 week
estimation period ending in the last date given left hand column, the factor loadings
 are equal to one where fund j belongs to style  J and are zero otherwise. This
constrained regression therefore allows for the possibility of style shift over the
estimation period.
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Figure 4: Implied asset allocation by Japanese funds
Figure 5: Implied asset allocation by foreign funds
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Figure 7: Breakdown of Japanese funds by GSC style benchmarks
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